Wrongful use of the rig may have contributed to the accident

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The Commission of Inquiry discovered several factors that may have contributed to the accident. Even though som hypotheses were discarded as the main cause of the accident, wrongful use and a lack of routines may have contributed to the accident.
Written by Norwegian Petroleum Museum

Unregulated moving

CFEM, the French shipyard that built the Alexander L. Kielland, blamed Stavanger Drilling and Phillips Petroleum Company Norway for the accident. The shipyard claimed that the rig was operated in a way that was not in accordance with established routines and instructions. This included the frequent moving of the rig between several positions when the rig was stationed beside the Edda platform.[REMOVE]Fotnote: White Paper nr. 67 (1981-1982), «Ulykken med plattformen ‘Alexander L. Kielland’», 29.

Kielland was operated as a flotell for the workers aboard Edda, and was connected to the platform via a removable walkway. When bad weather was expected, the gangway was raised, and Kielland was towed away to avoid collisions in the rough seas. Even though this practice was not uncommon in the North Sea, the shipyard pointed out that this frequent relocation also led to higher risks. This relocation technique was not part of the operating manual, and the workers were not trained in how this was supposed to be done. The combination of insufficient training and routines, in addition to rough weather conditions, led to a higher risk of overloading the rig.[REMOVE]Fotnote: White Paper nr. 67 (1981-1982), 29.

Insufficient anchorage

Anchorage at the Kielland was not according to the original anchorage plan. While CFEM had claimed that the rig always had to use all ten anchors (two per leg),[REMOVE]Fotnote: Control Room Operator Eivind Egeli in Smith-Solbakken, «Alexander L. Kielland»-ulykken, 189; CFEM, «Kielland Operating Manual», 89. only eight were used in practice. An oil pipline close to Edda had forced the use of an asymmetrical anchorage plan. This in turn led to a higher load on the remaining anchors. The operations manual recommends a symmetrical anchor plan, which would lead to a similar load on all anchors.[REMOVE]Fotnote: CFEM, «Kielland Operating Manual», 36. The shipping line submitted anchorage plans with eight anchors, which were approved by the Maritime Directorate, without the directorate requesting a numbers used for the calculations or a revision of the operations manual. They did however point out that anchor lines, inspections, and operating proceduers had to be “in line with normal practice”.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Norwegian Offical Report 1981:11, «Alexander L. Kielland»-ulykken, 53.

Norwegian Official Report 1981:11 pointed out that the anchor pattern was close to the limit of what should have been approved, even though both the Maritime Directorate and Det Norske Veritas approved it.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Norwegian Official Report 1981:11, 48, 49.

Survivors also reported that the anchoring was worthy of critique. Olav Svendsen, Senior Safety Officer on the Kielland, had observed an overloading of several anchor winches without any alarms sounding. After the accident, it was found that the alarm’s silencer switch was plugged.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Norwegian Offical Report 1983:53, «Alexander L. Kielland»-ulykken: Tilleggsuttalelse, 19; Commission of Inquiry Alexander L. Kielland 1983, Inspection notes 14.10.1983 This prevented its intended function, and raised questions about the safety practice on board.

Hasty conversion

Even though the Kielland had spent all her life as a flotell, it was initially built as a drilling rig. Before the accident, the rig was hastily modified for a drilling contract for Shell. Because of the conversion, the rig had extra crew aboard. The workers descirbed the rig as messy. Heavy equipment that were to be used in drilling operations was already taken aboard the rig.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Commission of Inquiry 1980, Interrogation notes, personell manager Jan Johansen; Stavanger Drilling II A/S 1982, Board meeting 12.02.1982. Ove Urheim[REMOVE]Fotnote: Ove Urheim in Smith-Solbakken, «Alexander L. Kielland»-ulykken, 230. , Per Mangseth[REMOVE]Fotnote: Per Mangseth in Smith-Solbakken, Minnebank Alexander L. Kielland-ulykken: Bd. 1. Vi som overlevde, 123. and Olav Svendsen[REMOVE]Fotnote: Olav Anton Svendsen in Smith-Solbakken, Minnebank Alexander L. Kielland-ulykken: Bd. 4. Vi som arbeidet og vi som var arbeidsgivere, 150. tell of things that were not fastened according to code. As the rig capized, equipment and containers started sliding and ultimately hit workers attempting to evacuate the platform.REMOVE]Fotnote: Smith-Solbakken, «Alexander L. Kielland»-ulykken, 263. 

The hasty conversion was partly due to delays in preparing the Henrik Ibsen, Kielland’s sister rig, which was due to replace her as a flotell, as well as climbing oil prices. Between 1979 and 1980, the price of oil tripled, partly due to the Iranian revolution. Shell and Stavanger Drilling had strong incentives to make Kielland an operative drilling rig, which had far higher rental rates than acommodation rigs. This may have contributed to the work on board being done hastily and some times in conflict with current rules and regulations.

Open doors and breach of routines

According to Emil Aahl Dahle, who wrote the stability report after the accident, routines for preventing water ingress were not followed. Doors and bulkheads that should have been closed, were left open, leading to a faster filling of the rig and higher risk of capsizing.

As the Norwegian Police inspected the rig after the successful righting, they found doors labeled “CLOSE THE DOOR”, which were left open. Cables kept the doors from closing. Dahle claimed that this beach of routines could show bad seamanship.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Tollaksen, «- Vi fikk aldri en diskusjon om sjømannskapet om bord», 31; Smith-Solbakken and Dahle, «Alexander Kielland-ulykken». According to the operations manual, all doors and hatches should be permanently closed, especially during storm conditions.

Inquiry and conclusions

The Commision of Inquiry considered the conversion and ballastdeployment, but concluded that these were not the main causes of the accident. The police denied the overloading theory after weighing the containers. Still, important questions about moving the rig, wrongful use of the anchor lines, and accomodation modules and their weight were never fully examined.

 

Stavanger Aftenblad has also written an article about wrongful use of the platform (Behind paywall)

 

References:

CFEM. «Alexander L. Kielland Pentagone 89 Operating Manual», 15. apr. 1976. RA/S-1165/D/L0003. National Archives of Norway. https://media.digitalarkivet.no/view/105511/853.

Commission of Inquiry Alexander L. Kielland, 14.10.1983. RA-S-1407/D/Ds/Dsb/L0635. Riksarkivet. https://media.digitalarkivet.no/view/112049/797.

Commision of Inquiry 1980, Interrogation notes, personell manager Jan Johansen. AV/RA-S-1407/D/Ds/Dsb/L0635. National Archives of Norway. https://media.digitalarkivet.no/view/112049/406.

Norwegian Offical Report 1981:11. «Alexander L. Kielland»-ulykken. Oslo: Ministry of Justice and Police , 1981.

Norwegian Official Report 1983:53. «Alexander L. Kielland»-ulykken: Oslo: Ministry of Justice and Police,  1983.

Smith-Solbakken, Marie, ed. «Alexander L. Kielland»-ulykken: hendelsen, etterspillet, hemmelighetene. Råolje. Stavanger: Hertervig forlag akademisk, 2016.

———, ed. Minnebank Alexander L. Kielland-ulykken: Bd. 1. Vi som overlevde. UiS Scholarly Publishing Services, 2024.

———, ed. Minnebank Alexander L. Kielland-ulykken: Bd. 4. Vi som arbeidet og vi som var arbeidsgivere. UiS Scholarly Publishing Services, 2024.

———, ed. Minnebank Alexander L. Kielland-ulykken: Bd. 5. Vi som støttet, bestemte og var tilstede. UiS Scholarly Publishing Services, 2022.

Smith-Solbakken, Marie, and Emil Aall Dahle. «Alexander Kielland-ulykken». in Store norske leksikon, 14. nov. 2023. https://snl.no/Alexander_Kielland-ulykken.

White Paper nr. 67 (1981-1982). «Ulykken med plattformen ‘Alexander L. Kielland’». Ministry of Local Government and Labour, 1981. https://www.stortinget.no/nn/Saker-og-publikasjonar/Stortingsforhandlingar/Lesevisning/?p=1981-82&paid=3&wid=e&psid=DIVL301.

Stavanger Drilling II A/S 1982, Board meeting 12.02.1982, AV/SAST-A-101906/A/Ab/Abc/L0009. The Regional State Archives in Stavanger. https://media.digitalarkivet.no/view/90940/826

Tollaksen, Tor Gunnar. «- Vi fikk aldri en diskusjon om sjømannskapet om bord». Stavanger Aftenblad, 12. jan. 2018.

 

Footnotes

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