The first attempt at righting the Kielland

The first attempt at righting Kielland was a major media event in the fall of 1980. As the complications in salvaging it grew, so did the criticism against the salvage companies and politicians. November 28th 1980, Minister of Fisheries Eivind Bolle ordered the attempted righting of the rig to be halted.

Lead-up

Only a few days after the accident, Odvar Nordli’s government claimed that money was no issue in charting the cause of the Kielland accident. This promise, along with the desire to find those still missing, led to the government supporting the idea of turning Kielland so that it could be inspected. The owner of the rig, shipping line Stavanger Drilling, and insurance stakeholders gathered in the Norwegian Oil Insurance Pool to advocate for the rig to be turned. Their rationale was that the rig could be turned, refurbished and used for further drilling.

What was left of the rig was towed to Kårstø where it was anchored April 20th 1980. It underwent several inspections to determine the scope of the damage. Divers examined the rig for three weeks and concluded that righting it was not out of the picture. While these examinations were underway, several salvage companies were asked to submit tenders for the righting operation. At the same time, CFEM, the shipyard that built Kielland were working on calculating the rig’s strength. This data along with the findings from the divers were relayed to the salvage companies before the offer period expired.

Righting without the use of external forces

Six salvage companies submitted tenders for the contract. The shipping company Stavanger Drilling examined the different proposals of righting the rig, along with the insurance stakeholders. The three finalists were Smit International, the Ugland Group and Structural Dynamics/Nicoverken Norway AS.

The shipping company and insurance stakeholders determined that Structural Dynamics Marine Ltd. and Nicoverken Norway AS were the strongest conteder, both in regards to price and technical solutions for the righting. The core concept was righting the rig without the use of external forces. The rig was to be filled with air and water, using ballast tanks and large balloons for buoyancy. Structural Dynamics Marine Ltd., often referred to as SD Marine was a newly founded company. Nicoverken Norge was also young, but existed as a subsidiary of the more established Swedish Nicoverken. It was a reputable company within the maritime industry. The turning method was tried on small scale models in Southampton and relied on extensive use of modern computer technology. The many ballast tanks already in the rig were to be fitted with valves and tubes, which could be controlled by computers. Filling the balloons, each with a buoyancy of 5 tons, was also to be controlled by computers. This method would make it possible to turn the rig one degree per hour.

The American Scot Kobus was appointed to lead and oversee the operation. Kobus had a background as a ship engineer and experience in leading salvage operations as well as a rescue diver. Within the oil sector, he was known as an expert on jack-up-rigs and semi-submersible rigs. In the eye of the Norwegian public, he was most known for his American and non-Norwegian demeanor.

Delay on delay on delay

Late summer 1980, Kielland was towed from Kårstø to the Gandsfjord where the righting operation itself was to take place. The rig was anchored August 27th, after a demanding towing. By now it was forecasted that the righting could start in the coursee of a few weeks. The planned start the operation was pushed to the fall of the same year. The weather was challenging and an operation of this size required large amounts of preparations. October 27th, everything was finally set and optimism was high in the salvage companies offices. The director of Nicoverken Norway, Jan-Olof Stomberg, told Stavanger Aftenblad that they expected the righting to last between four and seven days. The leaders of the righting operation were optimistic the first days. Scot Kobus could happily report that theory and practice were united, meaning that the Southampton simulations seemed to agree with the events unfolding in reality. At the same time he urged patience, as the large rig moved like an iceberg. Everything had to happen slowly, at least in the beginning.

Friday October 31st, the salvage companies could proudly report that they had turned the rig 20 degrees in one day, leaving it at a total of 62 degrees from its initial position. Everything was still as planned, and by month’s end they neared the most critical phase – the 90 degree mark. This meant that the deck with the acommodation area would be completely vertical. On Saturday November 1st, VG could report that this fateful point would be reached the same day and that Stavanger residents would flock to the scene to witness the final stages of the process. Those responsible for the operation were not at all worried about the fact that some of the buoyancy balloons had started leaking.

The platform did not reach the critical point this weekend, and the salvage companies reported that the bad weather and challenges with the buoyancy balloons had preventet this. As time went on, what was once optimism from the newspapers had started to sour. “Balloons burst for Kobus” Rogalands Avis could report November 7th. Klassekampen, already a staunch critic of the whole operation, was even tougher.  The day after, it reported on the righting as a great big gamble which risked the lives of those involved.

Problems come to light

They days came and went, with the rig not moving. It became apparent that the balloons could not provide enough buoyancy. The calculations used for the operation had not accounted for all the factors of the rig. Some struts that should have been intact and filled with air, were actually filled with water. In addition to this, the weight of the accomodation area was difficult to estimate. All of these factors caused delays and were starting to impact the economical foundation that the whole operation wqas built on. The agreement between the salvage companies and insurance stakeholders was limited to 42 million Norwegian Kroner. It had a low day rate, but the bonus upon completion was sizable to make up for it. Dealing with the fallout of persistant air leaks, took large amounts of manpower. This, coupled with ever increasing delays started to worry people.

The righting operation was not only a technical feat. The righting had complex human, poltical and economic aspects. There was a sizeable press corps that followed the process from day to day.  The bereaved of the 36 workers who were still missing experienced the process as especially taxing.

In the world of politics, major changes were afoot. In the fall of 1980, the Nordli cabinet was reshuffled. Minister of Petroleum and Energy, Bjartmar Gjerde, Minister of Justice, Andreas Cappelen and Minister of Local Government and Labour, Inger Louise Valle were replaced. This reshuffling had started before the righting had started in earnest, and applied to ministers that were responsible for the handling of Kielland.

Several of those who were critical of the righting worked hard on stopping the whole operation. One of the most vocal voices were Captain Ivar Garberg, who had acted as an advisor for NOPEF, the Norwegian Oil and Petrochemical Union. Odd Kristian Reme, the brother of one of the missing persons in the accident looked with fear as the righting progressed.

Crisis

Later in November, it was clear that the salvage companies had encountered more significant obstacles than they had anticipated. The Chief Information Officer of the Norwegian Oil Insurance Pool, Leif Monsen said to Bergens Tidenene in an interview November 13th that he was disappointed with the lack of progress. The operation had cost the insurance companies between 18 and 20 million Kroner, and they had started to fear that the rig would be a total loss. For the Oil Insurance Pool, a total loss would mean a payout of 320 million Kroner to the owners of the rig, Stavanger Drilling. As such, an emergency meeting was held between the insurance stakeholders and the salvage companies, attempting to decide whether or not cranes should be used to get the rig past the tipping point. Shortly after the meeting on November 13th, it was decided that cranes were to be used. With mounting challenges and costs, the insurance pool took a progressively larger part in the operation.

Two large floating cranes from the Swedish Neptun were hired. Late November, both had arrived in Stavanger to little effect. From the very beginning of the operation, several figures had been critical of the method of salvage and the salvagers themselves. Mountis discontent led to the numbers of critics growing. By November 26th, the doubt and distrust had reached the government. Still, Arvid Johnsen, the new Minister of Petroleum and Energy had reported that the government saw no reason to interfere with the ongoing work.

The Minister of Fisheries halts the operation

The salvage companies were prepared to put the cranes to work, in an attempt to scale this critical point. Just as Scot Kobus was going to restart the operation with his reinforcements, two days after Johnsen had denied government interference, everything changed. The trade union movement and technical experts had come with worrying news to the Norwegian Maritime Authority. They claimed that there was an imminent danger of the rig sinking if work was allowed to proceed. The Norwegian Coastal Administration had formed a task force that followed to operation closely. This task force claimed imminent danger of sinking, and as such advised the government to abort the operation. The formal order to halt was given on November 28th, and had its legal basis in the Harbour Law. This meant that the operation was under the juristiction of the Maritime Authority and the Ministry of Fisheries. Thus, Minister of Fisheries, Eivind Bolle stepped on the brakes. He was immedieately met with resistance from several fronts. Why was this decision taken without consulting the salvage companies and insurance stakeholders? Who had supplied the information about the imminent danger of the rig sinking?

The rig owners, salvage companies and insurance stakeholders were all surprised by this act. The insurance pool and Stavanger Drilling sent out a press release together on November 29th, where they said that “it was unfortunate that the Maritime Authority did not find it necessary to confer with the affected parties before declaring a lack of confidence in the salvage operation. Had the government contacted the insurers and shipping company beforehand, this dramatic turn of events may have been avoided.” The day after the order to halt, it was clear that the following discussion would continue over the weekend. After several meetings on Monday, December 1st, with the ministers of Fisheries, Finance and Petroleum and Energy, the government declared that it had decided to void its own stop order – under certain conditions.

This time however, it was the insurance pool’s turn to say stop. The uncertainty and financial losses had been too great. The insurance pool made themselves the main contractor and salvage companies subcontractors. The task at hand was now to restore Kielland to her initial position, fall of the same year. In mid-December, the board of Stavanger Drilling decided that they would seek a total loss of the Alexander L. Kielland. A decision that the insurance stakeholders did not protest against.

References

Dybdahl, Knut: «Slik snues «Alexander L. Kielland» in Teknisk Ukeblad vol 127 Nr. 39 1980

Fanebust, Frode and Smith- Solbakken Marie: Katastrofe og korrupsjon. Det skjulte spillet etter Alexander L. Kielland-ulykken. Res Publica. 2022

Nilsen, Bjørn: Gjenferd i Nordsjøen: Kiellandulykken i norsk oljepolitikk. Cappelen. 1984

Reme, Odd Kristian: Kielland: the battle. Hertevig forlag. 2023

Sellæg, Arne: «Stoppordre i Gandsfjorden: Feilslått forsøk på å snu «Alexander L. Kielland» i Norgesrevyen 1980 Nr. 4 Faktum.

Skretting, Tommas Torgersen: Alexander Kielland-Ulykken. Tragedien, spillet og hemmelighetene som kunne ha veltet en oljenasjon. Kagge forlag. 2019

Tagesen, Dag: ««Kielland»: Fra havari til snuing» Dreyer. 1983

Newspapers

«Rigger uten risiko kan ikke konstrueres» in Stavanger Aftenblad 29.09.1980

«Snuingen innledes klokka 14» in Stavanger Aftenblad 27.10.1980

«Sakte men sikkert snues Kielland» in Bergens Tidende 29.10.1980

«Kritisk fase «Alexander L. Kielland in 90 gr. vinkel» i VG 01.11.1980

««Kielland» over det kritiske punkt i natt» in Dagbladet 01.01.1980

«Går som planlagt. Plattformen snudd 62 grader» in Stavanger Aftenblad 31.10.1980

«Ballongene sprekker for Kobus» in Rogalands Avis 07.11.1980

«Gambling med «Kielland». Livsfarlig redningsoperasjon» in Klassekampen 08.11.1980

«Totalhavari for «Kielland» fryktes» Forsikringsselskapene avsetter operasjonsledelsen» in Bergens Tidende 13.11.1980

«Snu-operasjonen må godkjennes offentlig» in Stavanger Aftenblad 02.12.1980

Digital Archives

Press statement utsendt via NTB lørdag 29. november 1980 kl. 1930 (Pa 1503 – Stavanger Drilling AS)

Board minutes, Stavanger Drilling II 08.08.1980: https://media.digitalarkivet.no/view/90931/814 (Pa 1503 – Stavanger Drilling AS)